The adequacy of similarity to prototype as an account of categorization in natural concepts was assessed by analyzing the monotonicity of the relation between typicality of an item in a category and the probability of a positive categorization response using data from McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978). The analysis revealed a strong underlying similarity-based threshold curve, with systematic deviations. Further data collection showed that deviations from the curve could be attributed to the effects of unfamiliarity and non-categorial associations on typicality judgments, as well as differences between the perceptual appearance of an item (which tended to boost typicality) and its underlying nature (which tended to boost categorization). The results are discussed in terms of the different presuppositions and task constraints involved in rating typicality as opposed to performing a categorization.
Introduction
A critical issue in current theorizing about the psychological representation of natural concepts concerns the degree to which similarity can provide an account of our conceptual categorization of the world. Whereas similarity-based models, such as prototype and exemplar-based models (Rosch, 1975; Nosofsky, 1988) propose that conceptual categories are formed as clusters held together by the similarity of their instances, others have argued that categorization is based on a more rule-like or
